The Circuits-of-Power Framework for Studying Power in Institutionalization of Information Systems by Silva, Leiser & Backhouse, James
Silva and Backhouse/Power and Information Systems 
    Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 4 No. 6, pp. 294-336/November 2003 294
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Circuits-of-Power Framework for Studying Power in 
Institutionalization of Information Systems∗ 
 
Leiser Silva 
C.T. Bauer College of Business 
University of Houston 
Lsilva@uh.edu 
 
James Backhouse 
Department of Information Systems 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
james.backhouse@lse.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper introduces an adaptation of the Circuits of Power, a framework for studying 
institutionalization as an outcome of power. In this paper, we have interpreted each of 
the framework’s concepts and linked them to relevant research questions about power in 
the institutionalization of information systems. The institutionalization of an information 
system entails stabilizing its processes to such a degree that its associated practices 
become routine. We argue that an institutionalized system is both the result and a 
source of power. The original Circuits framework (Clegg 1989) is grounded in 
organizational theory and social sciences and integrates different perspectives on 
power. Each perspective unravels a different dimension of power that complements and 
enriches the others – hence it is a profound tool for analyzing a complex phenomenon 
such as power. In a longitudinal in-depth case study, we use the adapted framework as 
an interpretive research instrument to make sense of power and its relation to the 
institutionalization of an information system. The paper concludes by discussing the 
possibilities the framework offers to practitioners and its implications for researchers. 
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Introduction 
 
Questions about how information systems are related to power have been central to 
research in our field for the last two decades. There are studies concerning each stage 
of the information systems life cycle. For example, we know that analysts’ worldviews 
influence the systems analysis and final design stages  (Kling 1991; Tan, Watson, et al. 
1995; Tan, Wei, Watson, Clapper et al. 1998; Alvarez 2002; Davidson 2002).  This 
process can be laden with particular or group interests (Hirschheim and Klein 1994; 
Bloomfield and Coombs 1992; Sillince and Mouakket 1998; Griffith, Fueller et al. 1998, 
Robey and Boudreau 1999; Marsahall and Brady 2001; Thanasankit 2002; 
Saravanamuthu 2002; Howcroft and Wilson 2003). We also know that the 
implementation process can be a source of conflict between information systems 
professionals and users (Keen 1981; Markus 1983; Markus and Bjorn-Anderson 1987; 
Robey and Smith 1993; Newman and Sabherwal 1996).  
 
Furthermore, information systems, once in place, can be instruments of surveillance and 
control as well as tools for instilling discipline (Zuboff 1988; Introna 1997; Pinsonneault 
and Kraemer 1997). Likewise, information technology can be regarded as an instrument 
for empowerment and as a vehicle for autonomy (Bjorn-Andersen et al. 1982; Ehn and 
Kyng 1987; Williams and Wilson 1997; Dennis, Hilmer, et al. 1998). Researchers have 
also observed the political connotations of the information systems function in 
organizations (Lucas 1984; Cavaye and Christiansen 1996; Saunders and Scammel 
1986). Although individually all these studies have made contributions to our 
understanding of power, there has yet to emerge a theoretical model that can give an 
integrated account of power throughout the entire process of information systems 
design, development and implementation, that is, from conception to institutionalization.  
 
A recent study by Jasperson et. al. (2002) examined a sample of 82 papers concerning 
the relationship between power and information systems. Not surprisingly, they found 
that this relationship has been studied from multiple theoretical perspectives. 
Nevertheless, very few articles – 13 of the 82 – integrate different perspectives. The rest 
were one-dimensional. A one-dimensional view of power, however insightful, falls short 
in depicting its complexity. By contrast, as Jasperson et. al. (2002) notice in their paper, 
an integrative theoretical approach, by virtue of its variety, would not only present  the 
different insights of its components, but would also allow researchers to identify 
contradictions and paradoxes that otherwise would not be apparent. The idea that power 
is a phenomenon whose understanding requires multiple theoretical perspectives is also 
sustained in our field by Sillince and Mouakket (1997, 1998). Hence, the main purpose 
and motivation of this paper is the integration of different conceptions of power into a 
theoretical framework for the study of the institutionalization of information systems. 
 
We adopted the notion of institutionalization from the work of the sociologists Berger and 
Luckman (1967). By drawing on these authors’ work we can say that information 
systems become institutionalized when they are no longer considered as novelties, but 
as unnoticed and unremarkable tools that people take for granted in doing their work. An 
information system is institutionalized when associated practices and procedures have 
become routines that can be regarded as organizational habits. These organizational 
habits become typified in such a way that each particular type of action will be executed 
by specific kinds of users. We argue that the exercise of power is required to 
institutionalize a system, particularly if the system is resisted, and, once in place, it 
becomes a source of power.  
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Thus, this paper has two research objectives. One is the adaptation of a theoretical 
framework that was originally developed in the fields of sociology and organization 
studies to explore the role of power in the institutionalization of information systems. The 
second objective of the paper is to demonstrate the explanatory power of the framework 
by virtue of an in-depth case study. The value of the framework is thus shown in two 
ways. First, it guides the identification of the data required to compose a compelling 
narrative about the institutionalization of the information system. Second, it has value as 
an analytical tool by obtaining theoretical and practical implications about the 
phenomena of power and the institutionalization of information systems.  
 
This paper is structured according to our research goals. Hence, in the next section we 
introduce the theoretical framework, its main concepts, and our interpretation of how to 
apply it to study the institutionalization of information systems. Our research approach is 
introduced in Section Three, while Section Four presents the results of our fieldwork, a 
longitudinal in-depth case study that traces an information system from its inception to its 
eventual institutionalization. Section Five concerns the analysis of the case and 
highlights the different components of the framework and how they are related to the 
data. Finally, in Section Six we reflect on the implications, contributions, and limitations 
of our work.  
 
The Circuits of Power Framework 
 
The proposed framework is an adaptation of Clegg’s Circuits of Power (1989). Among 
the different theories for the study of power, we selected the Circuits framework because 
it integrates different views about and perspectives on power. The concepts brought 
about by Clegg derive from relevant advances in the sociology of sciences (Callon 1986; 
Callon 1987; Latour 1987; Law 1986) and the sociology of organizations (DiMaggio 
1988; Meyer and Rowan 1991; DiMaggio and Powell 1991). The Circuits framework also 
includes power concepts from political science and sociology, such as those found in the 
works of Lockwood (1964), Parsons (1967), and Lukes (1974). Clegg also integrates into 
his model the notion of disciplinary power (Foucault, 1977). In addition to combining 
different views of power, another of the appealing characteristics of the framework stems 
from its conception of power as fundamentally strategic, applying Machiavelli’s insights. 
Clegg is interested not only in the actions of organizational agents, but also in their 
intentions, strategies, and plots.  
 
In the Circuits framework, power is central in sustaining and providing stability to social 
systems. This is a different conception of power than the one contained in structuration 
theory (Giddens, 1984). Giddens (1984: 257) defines power as ”the capacity of agents to 
achieve outcomes.” It is essential in Giddens’ conception that individuals are 
knowledgeable and that in acting they reflect on their own situation. It would be fair to 
say that Giddens’ conception of power concentrates on individuals’ actions (Layder, 
1987; Barbalet, 1987). When comparing Clegg’s model of power with Giddens’ 
structuration theory, the most distinctive difference is that the former considers power 
beyond actions. In Giddens’ proposal, the idea of a knowledgeable individual is 
fundamental to understand how social life is structured. However, Giddens does not 
explain how the knowledgeable individual is constituted. By incorporating Foucault’s 
work into the framework, Clegg is able to link the construction of the knowledgeable 
individual with power. The knowledgeable individual, then, is the result of discourses and 
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disciplinary techniques. This is what Clegg’s notion of power adds to a conception based 
on agency.  
 
There are three circuits of power: episodic, social and systemic.1 Clegg argues that, for 
an innovation to be adopted and then institutionalized, it has to be integrated into the 
organization at three levels that correspond to the three circuits of power. These three 
levels are; episodic, social integration, and systemic integration. Each circuit is defined 
by a different type of power: causal in the episodic circuit, dispositional for social 
integration, and facilitative for systemic integration. Clegg uses the metaphor of circuits 
to emphasize the relational nature of power. In fact, nothing actually circulates or moves; 
this is merely a ready-to-hand metaphor. What occurs is that rules, procedures, and 
techniques of discipline shape both interpersonal relations and work tasks, thus 
circumscribing the scope for action of the individuals in organizations. So strong are 
these social and disciplinary forces that the electro-physical circuit metaphor renders the 
idea well.  
 
The Circuits of Power framework is not an exhaustive theory, yet it integrates several 
different concepts of power to account for the process of institutionalization. In this 
sense, Clegg (1989: 239) asserts that the virtue of his framework is “…to admit an 
insight to each distinct conception which the others do not share. On this basis, power 
can be understood analytically as moving through three distinct circuits, carried always 
by the organization of agencies.”2  It is the integration of those different conceptions that 
provides the theory with its explanatory power. As it will be shown in the narrative and 
analysis of the case, an account of power based on only one dimension would not be as 
clear as one that integrates different views.  
 
The following subsections offer a more detailed description of each circuit and present 
the aspects of information systems research that are derived from them. These have 
been summarized in Table 1. The Table shows the main concepts of the framework in 
columns one and two, and we introduce our interpretation and adaptation of the 
framework in columns three and four. In column three, we make a link between the 
concepts of the framework and previously researched power issues in the field of 
information systems, allowing us to formulate research questions.  Thus in our 
adaptation of the framework, we interpret its concepts, link them to information systems 
research issues, and frame specific research questions in order to account for the 
circuits of power in information systems institutionalization.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1 Clegg uses the term system integration; however, to avoid semantic misunderstandings with the 
way we use the term system, we will refer to this circuit as “systemic integration”.  
2 In his book, “Frameworks of Power” (see Clegg (1989)), Clegg argues for the integrative nature 
of his framework by discussing the different theoretical approaches to power from Hobbes to 
Callon (1986). It meticulously examines other organizational frameworks of power. For example, 
in discussing resource dependency theory Pfeffer, (1981) Clegg (1989: 190) would integrate this 
concept in his framework, in the sense that A’s power over B depends on A controlling resources. 
Furthermore, Clegg would extend his framework to the organizational norms and rules of practice 
that predetermine their relationship. 
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Episodic Circuit of Power and Causal Power 
 
The character of this circuit can be recognized in Dahl’s (1957) definition of power: A 
exercises power over B when A makes B do something B otherwise would not do.  For 
the purpose of this paper, we can define this relationship as the one that managers, or 
other powerful organizational agents, have with systems users. This relationship would 
be especially apt when managers make users operate a system that, given the 
opportunity, they would not otherwise use. John Law (1991) calls the power circulating in 
the episodic circuit ‘power over’ or causal power. The essence of ‘power over’ he 
maintains, lies in its relational nature, which can be seen in the relationship between A 
and B. The outcomes of causal power are actions; B does things he or she would not 
otherwise do. Therefore, without resistance, causal power cannot be identified 
(Foucault, 19823). It follows that we could not claim that power has been exercised if 
users were willing to use the system. In such a situation, causal power has not been 
exerted. 
 
For the purposes of studying the institutionalization of information systems as an 
outcome of power, the main research issue derived from this circuit is the identification 
of the As and Bs, establishing who are the promoters and champions of a system and 
who are its resistors. The next analytical step is the formulation of A’s desired outcome, 
articulated in terms of B’s actions; e.g. one strives to implement the system while the 
other struggles to resist it. In addition, we need to establish what are the tactics and 
strategies adopted by each side during these disputes. Finally, the episodic circuit is 
complete when we can identify the standing conditions of both A and B i.e. the positions 
that they occupy in the organization and the resources to which they have access and 
which they deploy in the course of their struggles over the system. As will be discussed 
in the next section, the concept of standing conditions directly links the circuit of episodic 
power with that of social integration. 
 
The Circuit of Social Integration and Dispositional Power 
 
While episodic power concentrates on causal power, the circuit of social integration 
emphasizes dispositional power, with its main elements being the rules that govern 
meaning and membership in organizations. Wrong (1995) conceptualized dispositional 
power as a set of capacities and made a distinction between the notions of having and 
exercising power. In this sense, a capacity is a characteristic or position that entitles or 
enables someone to exercise power, but does not necessarily imply its exercise. Power 
conceived in this manner is a capacity that can cause something to happen. Clegg 
                                            
3 Power is present even if there is no behavior associated. Clegg (1989) points out that limiting 
the analysis of power only to the concept episodic power would constrain our understanding of 
this phenomenon. In making this point Clegg cites Bacharach’s and Baratz’s (1962) notion of 
mobilization of bias; that illustrates how power is exercised without manifesting any behavior. 
Clegg complements Dahl’s behavioral definition of power by adding the other two circuits of 
power.  
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illustrates the idea of dispositional power with the example of a traffic police officer on a 
busy street who has the power to stop the traffic, whether he actually does it or not. The 
dispositional power of the police officer is embedded in the shared norms that bind the 
institutions of traffic regulations and the police in an urban society. Dispositional power 
becomes causal power when the policeman decides to intervene to regulate traffic. 
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Table 1. The Circuits Framework as proposed by Clegg; its relation to information systems and our interpretation 
Circuit Type of power Exemplary Research in information systems and Main Ideas 
 
Our Interpretation of the Framework in Terms of 
Research Issues 
Episodic   Causal Power 
When A makes B do 
something B otherwise 
would not do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Keen 1981; Markus 1983; Markus and Bjorn-Andersen 1987; Wynne 
and Otway 1982; Franz and Robey 1984; Newman and Robey, 1992; 
Robey and Smith 1993; Beath 1991; Newman and Sabherwal 1996; 
Sillince and Mouakket 1997; Tractinsky and Jarvenpaa 1995;Robey 
and Boudreau 1999; Torvinen and Jalonen 2000) 
 
• Focus on the relations between systems professionals and users 
• Emphasis on alliances and commitment for the implementation of 
systems 
• The idea of a champion getting support for a new system 
• Relations between managers and subordinates; the former 
inducing conduct by the latter 
 
 
• Who are the As and Bs? The identification of those 
promoting and championing the system and those who 
resist it. 
• What are the particular objectives of As and Bs in their 
struggles around the system? 
• What are the strategies and tactics adopted by As and 
Bs for the achievement of their objectives? 
• What are the standing conditions of As and Bs? These 
should be given in terms of the positions hold by As and 
Bs in the organizational structure. 
• What are the resources that As and Bs have access to 
and deploy in striving to achieve their objectives? 
Social 
Integration 
Dispositional Power 
It provides the conditions 
for As to exercise power. It 
is rooted in rules of 
meaning and membership 
of the organization. 
 
 
 
 
(Boland 1993; Boland 1996; Boland and Tenkasi, 1995; Kling 1991; 
Bloomfield and Coombs 1992; Monteiro and Hanseth 1995; Walsham 
1993; Noble and Newman 1993; Tan, Watson et al. 1995; Tan, Wei, 
Wei, Watson and Walczuch 1998; Alvarez 2002; Davidson 2002; 
Thanasankit 2002) 
 
• The relevance of language and meanings as channels of power 
• The role of language and discourse and its relationship to 
technology in the exercise of power 
• The relevance of status in power relations 
• Culture and power 
 
• What are the organizational rules and norms that place 
As and Bs in their respective positions? 
• How will the institutionalized information system affect 
those organizational rules and norms? 
• What are the meanings assigned to the information 
system throughout the institutionalization process? 
• What are the rules and modalities of interpretation 
drawn on by organizational members in making sense of 
the system? 
• How would these modalities be affected by the 
institutionalized information system? 
Systemic 
Integration 
Facilitative Power 
This power is fruitful in the 
sense that causes the 
organization to generate 
outcomes. It is defined by 
the techniques of 
production and discipline of 
the organization 
 
 
 
 
 
(Zuboff 1988; Orlikowski 1992; Walsham 1993; Bjorn-Andersen et al. 
1982; Hirschheim and Klein 1994; Williams and Wilson 1997; 
Pinsonneault and Kraemer 1997; Dennis, Hilmer et al. 1998; Griffith, 
Fuller et al. 1998; Sillince and Mouakket 1998; Tan, Wei et al. 1998; 
Marshall and Brady 2001; Saravanamuthu 2002; Howcroft and Wilson 
2003) 
 
• Information systems as the electronic panopticon; dominance 
and hegemony 
• Power and information systems as resources to achieve 
outcomes 
• Information systems as instruments of oppression or 
emancipation 
• Dominance in groups 
• Information systems and control 
• Achievement of organizational outcomes 
• What are the techniques employed by A to ensure and 
monitor B’s compliance? 
• What are the work tasks that are affected by the new 
information system? The work tasks before and after the 
institutionalization of the system. 
• How can the system be set up as a resource to instill 
discipline? 
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Dispositional power is the type of power that enables one organizational member to 
influence other members’ behavior even when such behavior may ostensibly be against 
their interests (Lukes 1974). Accordingly, the first research issue here is to identify the 
organizational rules that place A in a position to tell B what to do, and especially when B 
would rather do otherwise. It concerns directly the formal statutes and rules of the 
organization. By the same token, this issue entails the identification of the set of rules 
that leaves B in a position to be told what to do. In this sense, the analysis of 
dispositional power consists in identifying the standing conditions of A and B as 
discussed in the previous subsection. In addition, by its emphasis on the rules of 
membership, this circuit directs our attention to how an institutionalized system would 
affect the organization, specifically the composition of groups, roles and hierarchies. 
With successful deployment of power, the information system would eventually become 
institutionalized and integrated into the circuits of power of the organization.  
 
In addition to focusing on formal structures, this circuit also concerns the informal side of 
the organization. The system has to be associated with discourses that legitimate its use 
and existence (Weick 1995). In the process of institutionalization, different types of users 
will execute the processes and tasks associated with the system. As a result, the system 
may change or reinforce the way different organizational members think about their jobs. 
These are the modalities of interpretation created, reconstituted, refreshed, reinforced, 
and drawn on by organizational members when assigning meanings to information 
systems (Walsham 1993). Thus, in terms of rules of meaning there are two levels of 
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analysis. The first one consists in tracing the meanings assigned to the system, from the 
time of the resistance to the stage when they have successfully been institutionalized. 
And the second concerns in identifying the rules of interpretation drawn on by 
organizational members throughout and after the institutionalization process. 
 
 
The Circuit of Systemic Integration and Facilitative Power 
 
This circuit considers power as facilitative (Parsons, 1967). Hence it is understood in 
terms of its ability to produce and achieve collective goals. The facilitative notion of 
power is positive, characterized by a non-zero sum game and a productive conception. 
While dispositional power is concerned with the capacities that pre-configure the 
standing conditions necessary for episodic power to occur, facilitative power comprises 
the material conditions of production, including those technological means for controlling 
the physical and social environment in organizations. Clegg (1989) calls these means 
techniques of production and discipline.4 For example, in an organization, managers 
(As) could draw on different techniques to discipline employees (Bs) whose conduct is 
regarded as discordant to organizational objectives. In this situation, A’s actions are 
legitimized by her standing conditions and facilitated by the techniques available to her.5 
The resulting coordination in working practices is what we call systemic integration. 
 
Organizational activity depends ultimately on the subordination of individuals to 
collective goals. The techniques that ensure organizational compliance are what 
Foucault (1977) termed ‘disciplinary practices’. These practices consist mainly in the 
surveillance of organizational members through the collection, recording and comparison 
of data. These disciplinary practices can be recognized in different forms of 
organizational control over employees such as: “supervision, routinization, formalization, 
mechanization and legislation, which seek to effect increasing control of employees’ 
behavior, dispositions and embodiment, precisely because they are organizational 
members” (Clegg 1989: 191). In addition to techniques, organizations also adopt policies 
of rewards and sanctions for disciplining their members.  
 
As hinted above, this circuit addresses two main research questions: (1) what are the 
techniques deployed by A to ensure and monitor B’s compliance, and (2) what are the 
work tasks that are affected by the new information system? As discussed previously, 
the techniques of discipline are critical if the system is to be institutionalized. Once the 
institutionalization stage has been achieved, the system itself is transformed into an 
instrument for instilling discipline. Another research issue, therefore, is to identify how 
the system can be set up as a resource to instill discipline. Furthermore, the research 
task will be to distinguish the working practices related to the information system before 
and after its institutionalization. This is a power issue since an institutionalized system 
will affect the actions of organizational members as a result of the new work tasks 
embedded in the system. 
 
All together, these three different perspectives make the Circuits framework a strong 
                                            
4 In fact, Clegg (1989: 232) refers to facilitative power also as disciplinary, in the Foucaultian 
sense (Foucault 1977).  
5 These techniques are not all the resources available to managers or other powerful agents. 
They are disciplinary practices, such as the surveillance of organizational members through the 
collection, register and comparison of performance data. 
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analytical tool. Figures 1 and 2 depict how the three are combined. The circuit of 
episodic power determines the roles of As and Bs, which are defined by the rules of 
meaning and membership: the key components of the circuit of social integration. 
Likewise, the tactics adopted by As and Bs are related to techniques of production and  
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Figure 2. The Levels of Integration Required for Institutionalization 
 
discipline, which are the very fundamentals of the systemic circuit. This relationship is 
depicted in Figure 1. The arrows from social and systemic integration denote how the 
dispositional and facilitative power of A is the result of those two organizational circuits 
of power. Figure 2, on the other hand, illustrates how institutionalization is 
interconnected with the other two circuits, social and systemic integration. It depicts how 
the system, once institutionalized, becomes embedded in the circuits of power of the 
organization and turns into a source of power. 
 
In summary, we have seen in this section how we interpret each of the circuits of power 
and how they are linked to the institutionalization of information systems. In so doing, we 
have discussed how the power concepts suggested by the framework are related to the 
institutionalization of information systems. This paper argues that the institutionalization 
of an information system requires the integration of these three circuits of power and that 
institutionalization entails the system itself becoming a source of power. Hence our 
fieldwork has as its main purpose to demonstrate how this occurs in a particular 
organization. We collect data and establish our research questions regarding each 
circuit so we can develop a narrative of the case. The application of the framework will 
allow us to elicit theoretical propositions about power and the institutionalization of 
information systems. 
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Research approach 
 
The site 
 
This case study concerns the Center for the Study of Food and Nutrition Sciences of 
Central America (CFNCA)6, which has its headquarters in Guatemala City. One of the 
reasons we selected CFNCA as our research site was because of the compelling power 
issues in the adoption and institutionalization of its new administrative information 
system. Members of the organization identified conflicts and struggles throughout the 
design and implementation of the system, which is currently playing a fundamental role 
in managing the Center. Access was another factor in selecting this site. It is not easy to 
obtain access to organizations to do research, especially if the goal of the research is to 
discover power relations. Hence Buchanan et. al. (1988: 55) recommend a pragmatic, 
almost opportunistic, approach in the search of organizations for conducting fieldwork.  
But we were able to approach personnel and secure access to related documentation 
because one of the authors had worked there in the mid 1980s.  His previous experience 
with the organization provides us with insights into its politics. Besides, this familiarity 
was fundamental not only when selecting our interviewees, but also in gaining their 
confidence. 
 
The focus of this fieldwork is CFNCA’s computerized administrative information system. 
Implemented in the early 1990s mainly as an initiative to control the finances of the 
Center, the system was institutionalized by 1996. 
 
Given CFNCA’s semi-autonomous nature and matrix structure, its administration 
presents interesting power aspects (see Figure 3). CFNCA is part of the Americas’ 
Health System (AHS)7, which has its central offices in Washington D.C. and while AHS 
is responsible for the administration of CFNCA, the Center enjoys some degree of 
autonomy regarding the content, extent and human resources of its research projects, 
as spelled out by its founders, the Central American countries ministers of health, in 
1948. Under AHS’s administration, CFNCA's mission has been to conduct research on 
health and nutrition. AHS appoints two authorities to CFNCA: the research director and 
the administrator. The former is in charge of research activities while the latter manages 
the administrative functions. 
 
Data Collection 
 
We collected data in two stages. For the first stage, we spent six weeks at the CFNCA 
headquarters, from the second week of December 1995 to the third week of January 
1996. CFNCA’s authorities gave us an office where we were based every day from 8:00 
AM to 7:00 PM. During these hours, we conducted the interviews, typed the transcripts, 
attended meetings and also collected and reproduced relevant documents. The second 
stage spanned the autumn of 1996 to the end of January 1999. During that period of 
time, we visited CFNCA four times; each visit lasted about a week.  We maintained close 
contacts with our informants via e-mail and telephone throughout the second stage of 
our fieldwork. 
 
We developed interview guides following the concepts of the theoretical framework and  
                                            
6The name of the organizations has been changed. 
7 See footnote 7 
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Figure 3. CFNCA's Organizational Chart 
 
conducted a total of 35 semi-structured interviews with an average duration of two hours 
(see Table 1 and the Appendix). The interviewees were allowed to express their views 
on aspects they considered of importance. Rather than taping the interviews, we took 
notes and, immediately after each interview, typed the transcripts. Although we 
acknowledge that taping would have provided more accuracy in terms of the 
expressions and use of language, the interviewees would have not felt comfortable 
talking about power issues in the organization knowing that they would be taped. Among 
the individuals interviewed were the director, administrator, and IT staff, as well as 
people who had recently been made redundant. Interviewing redundant staff was one of 
the essential elements for obtaining information about the politics of the organization. 
We noticed that those recently released from the organization talked very freely about 
power, while those still employed showed more restraint. We collected and analyzed 42 
documents, including some written by external consultants. These consisted mainly of 
recommendations about the way the administrative information system should have 
been coordinated and the consultants’ evaluations of the overall status of the system. 
We were allowed to photocopy some of the documents; otherwise we took notes. We 
classified each document according to author, date and type of document (i.e. memo, 
report, etc.). These documents played a crucial role in providing us with multiple 
interpretations regarding the situation of the system (Klein and Myers 1999).8 
                                            
8 We constructed a Case Data Base. Documents were stored using the Endnotes package and 
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Data Analysis 
 
We adopted an interpretive approach for the analysis of the data (Klein and Myers 1999; 
Walsham 1993), reading all the transcripts, documents and observation notes in order to 
identify issues and themes related to the institutionalization of the information system. In 
our analysis and interpretation we emphasized power issues, informed by the concepts 
of the theoretical framework. Then we proceeded to write a draft report of our findings – 
a preliminary version of the case study – which we shared with three of our informants. 
We incorporated their feedback into our case study, which helped us to complete the 
hermeneutic circle (Klein and Myers 1999). After the second round of readings, we were 
able to write a narrative that described how the institutionalization of the system 
occurred. To clarify our analysis, we built a matrix containing the events that led to the 
institutionalization of the system. These events were arranged in chronological order and 
then classified according to the conceptual framework. 
 
The completion of the hermeneutic circle was also facilitated by one of the authors who 
had worked in this organization four years prior to the fieldwork, As mentioned above, 
this was fundamental for the analysis of our data since it provided us with valuable 
insights regarding the context of the system and the organization. In addition, the 
experience of working there helped us to identify the main data sources. Because of our 
knowledge of the organization, it was not difficult to identify who ought to be interviewed 
and which documents were relevant, and more importantly, where they were located and 
who owned them. Furthermore, we developed an almost immediate rapport with the 
interviewees because they perceived us as their friends. As a result of the former links, 
senior management, including the director, were favorably disposed toward collaborating 
with the research. 
 
Despite all the positive dimensions that stem from the familiarity with the country, culture 
and organization, there are still some limitations. Having worked at CFNCA might have 
created in us a predisposition or bias toward the political structure of the organization. 
Equally, it is possible that because some of the members of the organization were 
former colleagues, we might have held unconscious prejudices toward them. By the 
same token, it is possible that the interviewees might have thought: “Here comes the 
computer chap, playing the researcher role now.” We are aware of these limitations; 
however, we believe that the advantages of possessing knowledge of the prevailing 
culture outweigh the disadvantages. These circumstances were key for completing the 
hermeneutic circle in our interpretations. It is also clear that regardless of the type of 
relation between the researcher and the object of study, prejudices from both sides are 
unavoidable. Hence researchers engaged in this type of research should provide the 
readers with some assurance regarding the validity of their investigations. Klein and 
Myers (1999) offer a set of criteria that can be applied to gauge the validity of qualitative 
research in which interpretations are fundamental. They propose a set of six principles 
with which we can examine the validity of interpretive research. Table 2 shows how our 
research stands against such criteria. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
the interviews were stored, organized and classified using a word processor, Microsoft Word 
(version) 6.0. 
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Table 2.  Validation Criteria 
Klein and Myers Criteria Our Research 
 
1. Contextualization 
To make sense, the interpretations require the 
historical and social context. 
 
One of the authors used to work in the organization 
One of the researchers is a compatriot of the interviewees 
The historical and social context are presented in the results 
section 
2. Interaction between the researchers and the 
subjects 
The subjects of the interviews are offering their 
interpretations of the phenomenon under study. 
The social interaction between researcher and 
interviewees influence the study. 
Selection of documentary sources to complement transcripts of the 
interviews 
Recognition that the researcher drew upon his historical 
background in the selection of material and identification of sources 
 
 
3. Abstraction and generalization 
The generalization of particulars to abstract 
categories; generalization to social theories. 
The theoretical concepts are related to the field work through the 
interview guides and also are reflected in the discussion and 
implications 
The fieldwork illustrates the concepts of the adapted circuits 
framework 
The application of the adapted framework to the case study 
facilitated the generation of theoretical propositions about power 
and institutionalization of information systems. 
 
4. Dialogical reasoning 
The confrontation of the original assumptions 
and preconceptions. 
As the researcher used to work in the organization, the 
acknowledgement that the subjects could have had prejudices 
against the researcher and vice-versa. As this was acknowledged 
documents and observations were also conducted.  
The sharing of the preliminary case reports with informants. 
Informants provided their comments regarding whether our 
interpretations were biased or not. Their comments were 
incorporated into the preliminary versions of the case. 
The limitations of the theory and research approach are presented 
in the last section. 
 
5. Multiple interpretations 
The relationship among context, power, social 
actions and intentions 
 
The adapted Circuits of Power framework  makes sense of why 
different actors may have different interpretations of the system. It 
explains multiple interpretations in terms of different identities, 
group membership and interests. 
The research involved different types of interviewees whose 
statements were complemented with data from other sources such 
as documents. 
 
6. Suspicion 
The unravelling of distortions created by the 
political, social and historical contexts of the 
subjects 
 
We focused on different types of subjects 
The research focuses on how different actors had different 
interpretations and how these reflected their particular interests 
 
 
Case Narrative 
 
Stage 1: Genesis of the system 
 
The idea of the administrative information system began in 1990, triggered by a 
particular event. Because of the composite nature of the administration of CFNCA, 
clearance of accounts was not always a straightforward task. In 1989, an audit team 
from the U.S. government discovered anomalies in CFNCA operations that were 
financed by American funds, and vetoed payment for hundreds of thousands of dollars 
Silva and Backhouse/Power and Information Systems 
     Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 4 No. 6, pp. 294-336/November 2003       308
that had been contractually agreed upon. The reason given by the auditors was that 
certain operations had infringed upon specific regulations, such as the purchase of 
computers from outside the U.S. and official travel using non-U.S. airlines. The deficit 
created by the refusal to clear those accounts was covered by AHS, the guarantor of the 
American government in research project contracts. To resolve the crisis, AHS 
appointed a new administrator for CFNCA. When the newly appointed administrator 
began his job, he had one main goal in mind: to eliminate the deficit by applying strict 
controls supported by information technology. The deficit was substantial and the cause 
was deemed to be CFNCA’s unorthodox, almost maverick administrative practices. The 
administrative personnel told us, for instance, that quite often project managers would 
circumvent the formal administrative controls just to obtain faster authorization for their 
transaction requests. The administrator thought that a new information system would 
allow its department to incorporate tighter controls.  
 
To develop the new administrative information system, the administrator needed the 
support of AHS.  AHS was interested in the administrator’s project, but the conditions for 
Washington’s participation had yet to be defined. From the outset, AHS made it clear 
that they were prepared to pay for some equipment (the servers and the backbone of the 
network) and the salaries of those involved in the design and development of the 
system. The rest of the expenses, including PC clients, printers and basic office 
automation software, had to be covered with funds originating from research project 
budgets. The administrator offered his bosses in North America a reduction of the deficit 
by linking both budget and expenses. He pledged to incorporate into the system the 
AHS administrative rules, particularly those regarding the hiring of personnel and the 
acquisition of goods and services. The new administrative information system would 
force the researchers of the center to follow Washington’s regulations, and AHS 
authorities welcomed this.  
 
Besides his argument in favor of more strict controls, the administrator had another 
factor to support the approval of his project: he had a very good relationship with senior 
management in Washington. One former member of the administrative unit described it: 
 
The administrator had a wonderful relationship with the bosses in Washington. I think 
that the main reason he was appointed to solve the mess in CFNCA was the result of 
being a very good friend of the senior administrator in Washington. They were 
schoolmates a long time ago in their home country in South America. 
 
This boosted the administrator’s credibility and was key for his getting the support to 
develop the system. Thus, for AHS the new system was a way to save money and to 
strengthen its control over CFNCA’s operations. By early 1991, the administrator had 
AHS authorization to go ahead with the system, and its commitment to pay for a large 
proportion of the system’s expenses. 
 
However, the administrator also required the cooperation of the researchers, not only as 
prospective users but also as providers of the funds for purchasing the workstations. 
This was not an easy task. By 1990, research project managers had started to question 
the efficiency of the administration by comparing the contributions of their projects with 
the quality of the services received. When the administrator proposed the new 
information system, his unit was struggling to cope with the demands made by project 
managers. The limited memory of the old system, only 2MB of RAM, and its inability to 
deal with more than 24 users simultaneously, made the administration slow and 
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inaccurate in responding to project managers’ requests for information and services. 
This hindered the execution of research projects and the possibility of achieving results 
within the stipulated timelines. A research project manager described this situation:  
 
The former administrative information system was a real pain in the neck. We could not 
have information regarding the balance of our projects. We never knew how much 
money was available. Besides, the system was running all the procurement transactions, 
so whenever we needed stuff for our projects the administration department would take 
a long time before acquiring and delivering the goods. They would always put the blame 
on the lack of capacity of the computerized information system. 
 
The administrator won the support of the project managers after persuading them that 
the new system would improve administration services, and most importantly by 
pledging not to raise the cost of their services. In this way, the administrator was able to 
obtain the support of the authorities as well as the cooperation of the researchers as 
sponsors and prospective users of the system.  
 
Stage 2: Implementation, Disruptions and Resistance 
 
The design of the system followed completely the guidelines of AHS and the funding 
agencies without consulting the users. One of the researchers complained about it:  
In fact, I do not recall being called to talk to the designers or 
system analysts. I remember we were offered the system and we 
were asked to pay for the workstations with money from our 
projects. Yet, during the design phase, we were not consulted by 
the administration. 
The designers made many consultations; but not with the end users. Instead, they 
consulted documents, managers in the AHS headquarters and donor agencies. One of 
the designers expressed his views about how they proceeded: 
The head of the team was very clear in telling us that the most 
important feature of the system had to be the compliance with the 
rules and procedures of AHS and the major funding agencies. We 
had to spend a long time deciphering the meanings of the 
regulations to be able to implement those rules in the system. In 
many occasions when in doubt we phoned people from AHS and 
from the donor agencies. 
The development of the system took a year, and its implementation, until the production 
stage in late 1992 (see Figure 4), took a further six months.  
 
The new system had to achieve three objectives: (1) budget control, (2) financial 
transactions compliance with AHS and funding agencies regulations, and (3) 
enhancement of the administrative services provided to the researchers. Consequently, 
the system was developed with three main modules: budget control, accounting, and the 
automation of transactions. The main function of the first module was to ensure that 
each expense incurred by research projects corresponded to an entry in their annual 
budget plan. The second module handled operations such as payroll, check processing, 
balance statements, and the opening and closing of accounts. This module ensured that 
all these operations would comply with the regulations of both AHS and the funding 
agencies. The third module dealt with the automation of transactions such as the 
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acquisition of goods and services for the projects. The transactions supported by this 
module also included local and international trips, hiring and appointing personnel, 
transportation, printing, photocopying and purchase of equipment and office supplies. By 
virtue of the new system, researchers were no longer able to commit funds by informally 
contacting the personnel in the administration office. After the implementation of the 
system, any request for committing funds needed a hand-written authorization signed by 
three actors: the principal investigator, the administrator and the director of CFNCA. The 
idea behind the signatures was to make the researchers legally accountable for the 
transactions. The system helped CFNCA to achieve its first two objectives. Yet despite 
this success, the new strict controls brought in by the system did not speed up the 
delivery of administrative services.  
 
The system design favored the control from the administration over the operation of the 
research projects control the finances of the Center, the system was institutionalized by 
1996. It stressed strict financial controls that included manual controls for each 
transaction, and these were more important than the speeding up of the processes. 
Consequently, in order to buy a particular good, a research project manager, once 
logged onto the system, had to: 
 
1. Access the system and input the request. The user must specify the details of the 
entry in the budget that will cover the expenses. 
2. Print the requests. These requests must be signed by both the research project 
manager and the manager of the unit or department.  
3. Once the document is signed and authorized, the user informs the system that 
the document containing the request has been fully authorized. The request then 
reaches an administrative officer (the control officer) who establishes whether the 
document is appropriately signed and whether the entry in the budget is valid. If 
everything is in order, then the purchase request will be processed. 
4. Before the purchase is carried out, both the administrator and the director must 
sanction it by signing a document. The control officer will contact the supplier of 
the goods only after ensuring that the request and documents are in order; i.e. 
with all the required signatures and covered by a valid budget entry.  
 
Thus, the purchasing of simple office supplies may require up to six signatures and 
could take three weeks for delivery. Moreover, the whole process depends almost totally 
on the discretion of the control officer. (However, as every transaction will follow AHS 
regulations, the administration ensures the clearance of accounts. This had created 
problems for research project managers who had experienced delays in the execution of 
their projects). One of them described his perception of the administrative information 
system and the control units:  
The administrative information system gets stuck in the control 
units. Those are real bottlenecks. For example, when the 
document or order reaches one of those units, their personnel will 
usually say that the previous one did not do its job properly. 
Nevertheless, by the time they have made up their differences 
time has passed and we got delays. 
One of our interviewees complained with some humor about the paradox that 
transactions made on a computerized information system had to be accompanied by 
signed pieces of paper:  
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I call the administrative system Jurassic Park because it is a 
system that creates and follows transactions only through paper. 
Those in the control units do not move anything without a written 
signature. The system is a step backwards.    
Another complained about the number of signatures and waiting time for the 
authorization of requests: “… the problem with the administrative information system is 
the control units. For example, a purchase order can take up to 20 signatures. The last 
time I wanted to buy a stamp, it took me almost a week!” 
 
By early 1993, the first version of the system was a source of tension between 
researchers and the administration. It did not achieve its third objective: the 
enhancement of the administrative services. In terms of requirements, the system was 
designed according to AHS’ needs; however, it was disrupting the work of the 
researchers. Despite paying for and consenting to the new information system, research 
project managers complained about how the administrative tasks were taking away time 
could have been better spent on tasks directly related to the scientific nature of their 
projects. In addition, the researchers regarded use of the system as clerical in nature 
and not proper for their role as investigators. One of the support staff in the 
administration expressed it in the following manner: 
Researchers are not going to sit down and use the system. That 
simply is not going to happen. They say that it is because they are 
busy and do not have time. Yet, for me they do not do it because 
they regard the operation of these systems as having a clerical 
nature. They would see the use of the system as something not in 
agreement with their positions.  
Frustrated with the operation of the system, with its slowness and its failure to provide 
information for decision-making, the researchers openly complained during staff 
meetings, but to no avail. According to one researcher, the administration did nothing 
except take notes: “We constantly complained about the performance of the system and 
about the fact that we were not getting the promised better information and services. The 
administrator, though, seemed not to care…” Given the indifference of the 
administration, the researchers decided to express their discontent directly to AHS at its 
headquarters, and did so during a visit that two of the senior researchers made to 
Washington D.C. in the spring of 1993.  
 
In addition to their complaints about the systems, the two hinted that researchers in 
CFNCA were very unhappy with the administrator. According to one interviewee, people 
in AHS paid attention and promised that they would take to the administrator. However, 
the researchers’ concerns were never answered because though AHS called the 
administration to Washington, he simply explained that the complaints were a natural 
response to the newly introduced controls. One researcher recalled the events after the 
return of the administrator: “AHS, as expected, fully supported the administrator and did 
not do anything to resolve the problems with the system.” 
 
After his return from Washington D.C., the administrator continued with his 
implementation plan, and eliminated all parallel systems. Now, the only way the 
researchers could access their funds was through the new information system. As 
frustration grew, the researchers called an emergency meeting at the end of 1993. The 
meeting was long and heated, and the researchers told the administration that the 
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system was unable to deliver results on time and if the problems with the system were 
not going to be solved, they would go again to AHS. As a consequence, the 
administration created administrative assistant positions, which would operate the 
system and be funded with overhead costs.  While not totally happy with that financial 
agreement, the researchers realized it was the only way they could make the system 
work in a way that would get them their funds without disturbing their jobs. In the 
meantime, before the formal hiring, staff from the administration would be deployed to 
the researchers’ offices to operate the system.  
 
By the end of 1994, there were a total of seven administrative assistants, one for each 
research department, fully funded out of research projects. Within a few months of 
beginning their work, they were the only ones who knew how to operate the system. One 
administrative assistant described her relation with the researchers and administrators: 
The researchers do not use the system at all. They are not 
interested in the system, either in its operation or in its features. 
Any time they need something they would ask us to do it. We will 
operate the system and get the authorization from all the different 
actors.  
The researchers were pleased with the presence of the administrative assistants. One 
research project manager expressed it this way: 
My research projects would not operate without my administrative 
assistant. She does all the paperwork and looks after our financial 
transactions. Without her, I would have to do all the administrative 
chores and that would mean that I would have to work long hours 
dealing with administrative stuff. I would definitely hate that. 
By 1996, the system was playing a fundamental role in keeping CFNCA finances 
healthy. The administrator and AHS were satisfied and often boasted that, without their 
intervention, CFNCA would have become bankrupt. One senior member of the 
administration described the impact of the system: 
The administrative information system has been a complete 
success. Since its implementation we have not had any problems 
with our funding agencies and all the projects operate within the 
budgets. Each project is executed according to our norms and 
those from the donor. In fact we have received very positive 
feedback from AHS, they would like a system like this in their 
other research centers.  
Stage 3: The System Becomes Institutionalized  
 
In early 1997, after the hiring and training of the administrative assistants, the system 
was in full operation. CFNCA’s employees had adapted to the system and no longer 
joked or complained about it, and for new researchers the system was transparent. We 
asked one of them to talk about the administrative information system: “To be honest 
with you, I do not know that much about the system. It is Clara [her administrative 
assistant] who knows more about it.”  
 
The system has experienced some technical problems, but these have been solved 
routinely without bringing its existence into question: the system has been fixed in the 
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circuits of power of the organization. On our last visit to the site in 1999, although the 
system had been transferred to the Windows NT operating platform, the design and 
procedures still remained the same and had become objectified in the procedures and 
manuals of CFNCA. These documents refer to the system as a given, as the way things 
are done. It has also become a fundamental part of the training of new clerical 
employees. All new clerical staff receive a copy of the system user’s manual and take a 
course during orientation on how to use the system. We noticed that there are 
occasional instruction sessions in which employees are taught how to deal with new 
upgrades or modifications. The administrative information system has become 
embedded in the organizational structure of CFNCA and has become an unquestionable 
part of the organizational life; it has been institutionalized. 
 
Analysis 
 
Our first research objective was to adapt a framework to study power in the 
institutionalization of information systems. We present a summary of the adapted 
framework, in terms of its concepts and its relation to data in Table 1 and the logical 
relationships among the circuits in Figures 1 and 2. We applied these analytical tools to 
gather data and to compose the case study as presented in the previous section. The 
second objective was to demonstrate the explanatory power of the framework in an in-
depth case study. In this sense, Table 3 presents an outline of how the concepts of the 
framework are linked to the case. Table 3 is based on Table 1, the first three columns – 
the circuits of power, their type of power, our interpretation of the concepts, and the 
associated research questions – are the same; the fourth column corresponds to the 
data we obtained from the case. Table 3 demonstrates how we interpreted the original 
framework and linked it to information systems institutionalization. Although illustrative, 
this table presents a rather one-dimensional view of the circuits since it does not show 
how they evolved through time. The remainder of this section presents a detailed 
analysis of each circuit and how it evolved through time. 
 
We will carry out the analysis of the case by examining how each circuit of power 
became fixed and stable; that is how the information system its practices, associated 
meanings, regulations and techniques of production were integrated into the 
organization. Given that each circuit represents a different perspective of power, we will 
analyze each separately. Table 4 presents the state of each circuit of power throughout 
the three stages toward the institutionalization of the system: genesis, implementation 
and final institutionalization. After the analysis of each circuit, we will argue that a richer 
picture of power would require the combined view of the three circuits.  
 
Episodic power 
 
Figure 4 shows the chronology of how integration was achieved (Figure 4 is based on 
the data of Table 5). Integration has been categorized into either low or high, and the 
level of integration of each circuit is affected by the actions of the power players (i.e. the 
As and Bs), those involved in the episodic circuit of power. Episodic power will be 
integrated into the organizational practices when there is no substantive conflict and 
resistance; that occurs by 1995 after the hiring of the administrative assistants. The 
integration of the episodic circuit means that A does not have to exercise power over B 
because B’s conduct regarding the system was been converted into an organizational 
habit. Once the system was institutionalized, the administrator did not need to draw on 
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his resources or any disciplinary technique to ensure the compliance of the researchers, 
as the system had become an organizational routine. 
 
In analyzing the power relations concerned in this circuit, it is necessary to distinguish 
the As from the Bs, their respective standing conditions, as well as the course of action 
that A wants B to follow. In this case, the As are the administration of CFNCA 
represented by the administrator, while the Bs are the researchers. The course of action 
the administrator wants the researchers to follow is to comply with AHS regulations, 
implemented via the new information system. This is an issue of power since the 
researchers would not have changed their maverick style of management without the 
administrator exercising causal power through the new information system. Moreover, it 
is an issue of power given the resistance posed by the researchers.  
 
The standing conditions of the administrator were given by official authority delegated by 
AHS and by the close relationship he had with his bosses in Washington. The authority 
of the administrator was legitimate, as it was rooted in the statutes of CFNCA, which 
clearly stipulate that the Center has to be administrated by AHS. Besides, the 
administrator was also on good terms with senior management in Washington, a 
compatriot and friend of the central administrator. Hence the CFNCA administrator drew 
upon his authority and credibility to obtain the necessary resources to finance the 
system, to attain the support from the headquarters and, much more importantly, to 
legitimize his actions. As described by Beath (1991) in her research about top 
management support, the administrator was a champion who gathered support for his 
project by aligning the objectives of the system with those held by the authorities of the 
organization.  
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Table 3. The Circuits of Power and the Administrative Information System 
Circuit Type of power Our Interpretation of the Framework in Terms of 
Research Issues 
The Circuits of Power in CFNCA 
Episodic   Causal Power 
When A makes B do 
something B otherwise 
would not do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Who are the As and Bs? The identification of those 
promoting and championing the system and those who 
resist it. 
• What are the particular objectives of As and Bs in their 
struggles relating to the system? 
• What are the strategies and tactics adopted by As and 
Bs for the achievement of their objectives? 
• What are the standing conditions of As and Bs? These 
should be given in terms of the positions hold by As 
and Bs in the organizational structure 
• What are the resources that As and Bs have access to 
and employ in striving to achieve their objectives? 
 
• The As are the administrator and the authorities in Washington, the Bs the 
researchers 
• The As want to control and discipline the finances of research projects 
• The Bs want to execute the funds of their projects without delay 
• The As have drawn upon the administrative information system to discipline the 
Bs. The Bs have tried to outflank the As, specifically the administrator, by 
approaching his bosses in Washington, D.C. 
• The As standing conditions are given by the rules and organizational structure 
of CFNCA as well as the contractual relations between donors and AHS. The 
Bs standing conditions stem from their obtaining the funding for projects and 
their reputation that allows them to be funded 
• The As have the funds provided by AHS to develop the system. In this sense, 
the Bs do not have any formal resources to oppose the As 
Social 
Integration 
Dispositional Power 
It provides the conditions 
for As to exercise power. 
It is rooted in rules of 
meaning and 
membership of the 
organization. 
 
 
 
 
• What are the organizational rules and norms that place 
As and Bs in their respective positions? 
• How will the institutionalized information system affect 
those organizational rules and norms? 
• What are the meanings assigned to the information 
system throughout the institutionalization process? 
• What are the rules and modalities of interpretation 
drawn upon by organizational members in making 
sense of the system? 
• How would these modalities be affected by the 
institutionalized information system? 
 
• The statutes and organizational structure of CFNCA 
• The institutionalized information system will reinforce the current structures of 
CFNCA. That is the As controlling the administration and finances of CFNCA. 
• For the As the system was associated with instilling discipline and bringing 
back financial health to CFNCA. For the Bs initially the system was regarded as 
disruptive 
• The As interpreted the system in terms of control. The Bs interpreted the 
system in terms of efficiency 
• The modalities of interpretation remained the same, if not reinforced after the 
institutionalization of the system. This is because the system did not modify any 
of the standing conditions of both the As and the Bs 
Systemic 
Integration 
Facilitative Power 
This power is fruitful in 
the sense that it induces 
the organization to 
generate outcomes. It is 
defined by the techniques 
of production and 
discipline of the 
organization 
 
 
 
 
 
• What are the techniques deployed by A to ensure and 
monitor B’s compliance? 
• What are the work tasks that are affected by the new 
information system? The work tasks before and after 
the institutionalization of the system. 
• How can the system be set up as a resource to instill 
discipline? 
• The As defined the administrative information system as an obligatory passage 
point for the Bs; without using the system, the Bs could not execute their 
projects. Likewise, the system itself had inscribed the regulations that the As 
wanted the Bs to follow. Thus by virtue of the system the As were ensuring the 
compliance of the Bs with the formers’ objectives. 
• The work tasks affected by the information system were the administrative, 
financial, accounting and procurement practices. Before the institutionalization 
of the system those practices were executed almost at the discretion of the 
researchers. After the institutionalization of the system those practices were 
conducted according to the As’ regulations. Indirectly, the system had a 
negative effect on research tasks made the researchers to dedicate time to use 
the system. This was solved by the hiring of the administrative assistants. 
• The system was purposefully deployed to instill discipline in the Bs’ 
administrative, financial, accounting and procurement practices. 
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Table 4. The Circuits of Power and the Institutionalization of the System 
Stage 
 
Episodic Circuit Social Integration Systemic Integration 
 
Stage 1 
Genesis of the 
System 
A makes B use the 
System. 
The Administrator makes 
the researchers change 
their managerial practices. 
Without the intervention of 
the administrator the 
researchers would have 
not changed their 
practices by using the 
system. 
 
A’s dispositional power is given by 
the rules of meaning and 
membership. 
The administrator was able to 
develop and implement the 
system because he was in a 
position of authority and had a 
good relation with AHS. Besides 
the system was deemed to help 
AHS to control CFNCA. 
A’s facilitative power is given by 
techniques of discipline and 
production. 
The success of the 
administrator’s project was 
facilitated by the way CFNCA 
operates its projects; that is all 
the project funds are fully 
controlled by AHS through the 
administration. Researchers 
could not access the funds 
without the control of the 
administration.  
 
Stage 2 
Implementation 
The administrator cannot 
make the researchers to 
use the new system. 
CFNCA creates the 
position of the 
administrative assistants. 
These become the agents 
of the researchers and 
eventually become users 
of the system in the end. 
Social integration is disrupted as 
the researchers regarded the use 
of the system as a waste of time 
and as having a clerical nature. 
Social integration is achieved by 
the administrative assistants role. 
It was legitimate for them to attend 
training sessions and to operate 
the system. 
Systemic integration is 
disrupted because the system’s 
procedures were in direct 
contradiction with the working 
practices of the research 
project managers. 
 
Systemic integration was 
achieved when the 
administrative assistants 
arrived. In this way the working 
practices of the researchers 
were not disrupted and the 
original processes embedded 
in the system remained intact.  
Stage 3 
The system is 
institutionalized 
Episodic power ceased 
(no As were making Bs to 
do something Bs would 
not otherwise do). 
 
Now there are only 
routines that people in the 
organization execute as 
part of their organizational 
life 
The information system as 
institutionalized reinforces the 
rules of meaning and membership 
of the organization. 
Administrative tasks are 
performed by clerical employees. 
It is a source of dispositional 
power as it empowers the 
administration and the 
administrative assistants to deal 
with the details of the execution of 
the projects. 
It boosts the dispositional power of 
AHS and the administration since 
the system legitimates their 
intervention in the Centre 
The institutionalized 
information system has 
become a fundamental 
technique of production in the 
organization. Without it, 
projects could not be executed. 
It has also become a technique 
of discipline since it is the 
means by which AHS and the 
administration control the 
finances of the projects. 
It is a source of facilitative 
power because the system 
allows the organization to 
operate, and AHS to control it, 
without interfering with the work 
of the researchers. 
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Figure 4. Chronology of the Integration of the Circuits 
 
The standing conditions of the researchers stemmed from their core activity of research. 
Their initiatives and reputations had attracted the financial resources that had funded 
CFNCA operations throughout its existence, and this was their main source of power. 
However, they lacked the formal authority of the administration to withhold funds, and 
consequently did not have any right to ignore controls within the Center. The 
researchers could not access their funds without passing through the administration 
division. Moreover, unlike the administrator, they did not have any formal lines of 
communication with Washington. Figure 3 shows the lines of command according to the 
organizational chart.  Furthermore, the researchers were not as well organized as the 
administration. They usually worked independently and concentrated mostly on their 
individual projects. The administrator and his division, on the other hand, were 
cohesively organized in a tight hierarchy. Thus, the cohesiveness of the administration 
division, plus the formal authority, as well as his close relations with AHS gave the 
administrator stronger standing conditions than those of the researchers. Eventually, the 
causal power exerted by the administrator over the researchers was effective in curbing 
the researchers’ initial resistance. Nevertheless, as discussed below, the 
institutionalization of the system cannot be understood simply in terms of the relations 
between As and Bs, it requires the complement of the other two circuits. 
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Table 5. The Circuits of Power and the evolution of  administrative information system 
Circuits of 
Power 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995-1996 
Episodic New 
administrator 
proposes a new 
information 
system. 
 
The 
administrator 
obtains the 
resources 
and authority 
to develop 
the system. 
 
The system is 
developed and 
implemented. 
The 
researchers 
resist the 
system. They 
express their 
frustration to 
the 
administrator 
and complain 
directly to 
AHS. 
The position 
of 
administrative 
assistants is 
created. 
 
Administrative 
assistants are 
hired. 
The system is 
institutionalized, 
it is integrated in 
the circuits of 
power of the 
organization and 
it is the product 
of power and a 
source of power. 
Social To AHS the 
system is 
presented as a 
tool for control 
and for the 
researchers as 
a tool for 
efficiency and 
source of 
information. 
 
For AHS the 
system will be 
a tool to 
reduce losses 
as the result 
of tighter 
controls. 
The 
researchers 
look forward 
to a more 
robust 
system. 
The 
researchers 
were not 
consulted 
either for the 
design or for 
the 
development. 
AHS was 
consulted 
throughout the 
whole process. 
 
AHS fully 
supports the 
administrator. 
The 
researchers 
regard the 
system as 
non-sense, a 
joke and as a 
threat to their 
identity, since 
it is clerical in 
nature. 
 
The system is 
no longer 
regarded as a 
nuisance. 
Researchers 
and AHS are 
satisfied with 
the system. 
The system 
defines new 
roles in the 
organization. 
Systemic The current 
system fails to 
cope with all the 
demands given 
its weaknesses. 
 
 The system is 
designed and 
developed 
completely 
following the 
regulations of 
AHS. It 
disturbs the 
tasks of the 
researchers 
 
The 
administrator 
eliminates 
parallel 
systems. The 
only way to 
access funds 
is through the 
information 
system.  
 
The system is 
in full 
operation. 
The losses 
are cut and 
the 
researchers 
can access to 
their funds 
without taking 
time out of 
their tasks. 
The system is 
embedded in the 
tasks of the 
organization and 
it is a 
fundamental 
instrument for 
AHS to control 
CFNCA. 
 
 
Social Integration 
 
The main task in this part of the analysis is to identify the rules of meaning and 
membership that are related to the information system (see Table 3). For the 
administrator, the rules for interpreting the system were based on control, while for the 
researchers they were seen in terms of efficiency. Regarding the rules of membership, 
the researchers associated the operation of the system with clerks, whereas the 
administration believed the system should be used by the researchers. Social integration 
could be achieved as long as the system did not contradict those rules.  But the first 
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version of the system did result in contradictory meanings among organizational 
members, as it was designed to reflect the requirements of the administration instead of 
the users. Hence, the researchers’ initial rejection. Conversely, the system was a 
complete success for the administration, as it was the instrument for enforcing the 
stricter controls that eventually reduced CFNCA’s deficit. Moreover, it was a feather in 
the cap of the administrator who was regarded in Washington as the one able to restore 
order in CFNCA.  
 
In terms of meanings, then, for the administration the system was an instrument to 
improve organizational performance, while for the researchers it was a nuisance that 
slowed down the running of their projects. This tension, originating in contradictory 
interpretations of the same system, was resolved by hiring administrative assistants. 
This was fundamental for the social integration of the system, as it impacted the original 
meaning assigned to the system. It changed the researchers’ early interpretation of the 
system from being an obstacle, an imposition from AHS and a joke, to becoming an 
almost invisible tool crucial for the operation of the Center.  
 
As pointed out in the theory section, to achieve social integration an information system 
would also have to be aligned with the rules of membership of the organization. Since 
the researchers interpreted the operation of the system as clerical, they were not keen 
on being associated with it. This objection dissipated when they delegated the use of the 
system to the administrative assistants. The researchers’ interpretation of the system did 
not change, but as long as it was operated by the assistants they did not complain. The 
researchers’ rejection of the system on the grounds that it contradicted the nature and 
tasks associated with their particular profession coincides with what Bloomfield and 
Coombs (1992) found in the British National Health Service (NHS). They found that 
physicians resisted the use of an information system that required them to input data, as 
this task was thought to be associated with nurses’ duties. As did the researchers of 
CFNCA, doctors regarded the use of the information system as an affront to their 
professional identity. Thus, social integration would not have been achieved without 
delegating the operation of the system to the administrative assistants. It meant that the 
professional identity of the researchers remained unthreatened. 
 
Systemic Integration 
 
The first version of the system did not reach systemic integration either. Initially, the 
system contradicted the current practices for committing the funds of research projects, 
introducing more formalized and bureaucratic procedures where project leaders were 
previously able to directly (access the services of?) the administration clerks. The new 
system became an obligatory passage point (Callon, 1986) for the researchers 
whenever they wanted access to the funds of their projects, but one that seriously 
disrupted the working practices of CFNCA. Tension resulted when the researchers 
demanded the system be changed. At the same time, the administrator did not want to 
alter the processes embedded in the system because they were the conductors of the 
necessary AHS control measures. This tension was the origin of the need for the 
administrative assistants’ positions.  
 
The administrative assistants become the buffers between the researchers and the 
administration division of CFNCA, and this was the solution for integrating the system 
into the work tasks of CFNCA. The assistants both ensured that the strict financial 
controls remained in place and freed the researchers from administrative tasks so they 
Silva and Backhouse/Power and Information Systems 
     Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 4 No. 6, pp. 294-336/November 2003       320
could concentrate on their research projects. Although the system, in terms of software 
and procedures, remained the same, it reached systemic integration because the 
administrative assistants freed the researchers from all administrative tasks. In this 
sense, the system was transformed when its intended main users changed. Thus, 
systemic integration was achieved by the introduction of the administrative assistant 
position since it allowed the main productive task of the organization, research, to 
remain undisrupted.  
 
Achieving systemic integration does not mean that the new information system leaves 
the working practices of an organization unaltered. Our data shows how the system 
instilled discipline in the administrative practices and enhanced control from AHS. The 
net result was that, after the introduction of the administrative assistants, researchers 
continued doing their research, and AHS ensured that the Center would have healthy 
finances. However, it raised the costs of doing research because the Center had to pay 
for the assistants. In addition, the presence of the assistants increased the bureaucracy 
and size of the organization, and the researchers had to accept this situation as the 
circuits of power of the Center favored the standing conditions of the administration.  
 
The three circuits 
 
Explaining the institutionalization of the system from the perspective of a single circuit 
would had given us an incomplete account. If each circuit were a lens, when used 
individually it would only reveal one dimension of power. However, the combination of 
the three circuits provides an enhanced view, as happens when a collection of lens 
filters are superimposed. The episodic circuit, by its emphasis on action and causal 
power, would have provided an explanation based solely on events. Thus, we would 
have learned about the conflict resulting from lack of user consultation and poor design.  
Such conflict has already been documented in our field (Mumford, 1987; Davis, 1989). 
Although illuminating, these theories do not tell us why, despite the lack of participation 
and poor design, the system is accepted and later institutionalized. A likely explanation 
is politics, but politics in this sense is regarded as the illegitimate side of power 
(Mintzberg, 1983; Hirschheim and Klein, 1994) consequently it is black-boxed, with the 
result of hindering our understanding of power.  
 
Keen (1981) identified the need to unscrew the black box of politics in his classic paper 
on organization and change. There he urged researchers in our field to conduct studies 
to shed light on such a complex phenomenon:  
Unfortunately, 'politics' have been equated with evil, corruption 
and, worst of all, blasphemy in the presence of the Rational Ideal, 
but politics are the process of getting commitment, or building 
support, or creating momentum for change; they are inevitable...It 
is absurd to ignore it...A political perspective on information 
systems is needed in research. It will of necessity be based on 
comparative field studies that illustrate theoretical concepts…It 
can immensely add to our understanding both of the implications 
of information technology and the dynamics of effective 
implementation.p.31-32  
By considering the other two circuits, we can complement the episodic account of power 
and open the black box of politics. Thus, it was his close relationship with senior AHS 
management (politics) that led the administrator’s view to eventually prevail. The circuit 
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of social integration allowed us to identify the administrator’s sources of power: being 
appointed by AHS and by enjoying the friendship and trust of senior management in the 
headquarters. Moreover, the circuit of social integration allowed us to identify that one of 
the roots of resistance and conflict was the meaning assigned by the researchers to 
operating the system. They felt that operating the system undermined their status as 
researchers. The circuit of social integration, then, helps to explain why one party 
resisted and why the other prevailed. 
 
Systemic integration was also key to complete the picture of power. It highlighted both 
the failure of the system to deliver value to the main users, and its success for the 
administrator in controlling CFNCA’s operations. Since the system was a vital instrument 
for achieving the objectives of those in power, the disruption was corrected not by 
modifying the essence of the system, but by adding more intermediaries to the system, 
in this case the administrative assistants. Thus, the circuit of systemic integration 
allowed us to explain why a disruptive system becomes institutionalized. In this case the 
disruptions were compensated not by modifying the software, but by adding more staff.  
 
In sum, we have analyzed each circuit and supported with evidence our argument that 
for a system to be institutionalized it requires the integration of the three circuits of 
power. Causal power is exercised by A when B is resisting. Institutionalization is 
achieved when the system is no longer contested and it has become a routine in the 
organization. We have argued that resistance will arise when the system is perceived as 
a threat for the users or if it disrupts working practices; and will continue to be resisted 
as long as it does not achieve social and systemic integration. We also have shown that 
by looking at the three circuits of power we enrich our understanding of power relations 
in the context of the institutionalization of an information system. In the next section we 
discuss the implications of our research. 
 
Implications 
 
We will first discuss the theoretical implications of our research and put forward a set of 
propositions derived from applying the framework to our case that are aimed at 
theorizing about the process of institutionalization and its relation with power. Second, 
we will articulate implications for practitioners and suggest some ways in which the 
framework can be applied. The section concludes by discussing the limitations of our 
research. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
 
The Circuits framework has been applied to the study of power and information systems 
elsewhere (Introna 1997; Silva and Backhouse 1997), however, these works draw on 
secondary data sources to study a system in a short period of time. Our research, on the 
other hand, applies the framework for gathering and analyzing data in a longitudinal 
study. Jasperson et. al. (2002) underline the benefit of longitudinal studies for research 
on power since power relations and their effects require a longer span of time to be 
identified. Our research is also different, as it applies the framework to an 
institutionalization of a system rather than a failure.  
Our main theoretical contribution is the adaptation of the Circuits framework so that it 
can be applied by other researchers interested in studying power. Barnes (1990) notes 
that one of Clegg’s limitations is that he does not make any link between theory and 
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data, a limitation for researchers intending to apply the framework. In this paper, we 
interpret and adopt each of the concepts from Clegg and we link them with the data 
required for studying information systems and power (see Table 1 and Table 3). Given 
the lack of studies in our field that integrate different views of power (Jasperson et. al., 
2002) this is a relevant contribution.  As we have argued in the previous section, the 
integrated view of power brings about the identification of its different elements that 
otherwise would escape analysis. This approach makes it possible to propose a 
concrete connection between the framework and data, and accordingly we have 
formulated three theoretical propositions about power and institutionalization. 
 
1st Proposition:  The regulations and rules inscribed into an information system that has 
been contested will favor the interests and goals of those who during the struggles held 
the strongest standing conditions 
 
The Circuits framework also calls our attention to apply a counterfactual proposition as a 
means of analysis to learn about power relations in an organization. In other words, in 
examining a system, we could say that the regulations and rules the system embodies 
would not have been there without the exercise of power; especially if the system has 
been previously contested. In our case, it was clear that the regulations and rules 
automated by the system were directly dictated by AHS. Had the researchers been 
effective in rejecting the system, we might argue that the system would have had 
different regulations, favoring the managerial style of the researchers. Thus, an 
implication of our research would be that practitioners and researchers can learn a great 
deal about the power relations of an organization by looking at who “owns” the rules and 
regulations of the system.  
 
This proposition has been addressed by researchers of information systems, particularly 
in the Scandinavian tradition. This tradition, and specifically the collective resource 
approach, assumes that often the development of organizational information systems is 
an arena in which two groups of stakeholders meet and in which the interest of one 
group, that of management, prevails over the other group, workers (Bjerknes and 
Bratteteig 1995). To paraphrase this relationship in episodic power terms, managers 
(As) make workers (Bs) use a system that, given the chance, the workers would reject.9 
Our research, then, is complementary to the observations made by Scandinavian 
researchers – specifically with the collective resource approach – in the sense that 
information systems reflect the power relations prevailing in the organization. As a 
corollary, proposition one suggests that the Circuits framework can be used in the post-
implementation phase to evaluate the power conditions in which the system was 
developed. In our case, the information system represents the power relations between 
administrators and researchers since it has inscribed the regulations and controls 
specified by AHS. 
 
This proposition is also related to the Socio-Technical approach to developing 
information systems that focuses on job satisfaction. In discussing critical issues to 
assure the integrity of information systems, Mumford (1983: 26), one of the main 
exponents of this approach, suggests that the exercise of power can result in an 
                                            
9 Given this situation Scandinavian researchers have argued in favor of a democratic approach to 
develop information systems that reflects equally both parties’ interests (Bansler 1989; Livari and 
Lyytinen 1998).  
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information system having a one-sided influence. To eliminate power and its related 
biases, Mumford advocates for users’ participation and for the presence of a facilitator.10 
Although desirable, a power-free situation may be difficult to achieve given that, in 
discussions and negotiations, different stakeholders bring to the table different identities 
and opposing interests (Callon 1986). This shortcoming of the Socio-Technical approach 
was previously pointed out by Hirschheim and Klein (1994: 85): “We believe the main 
weakness of participation programs has been that they failed to take into account the 
political background constraints that most clearly manifest themselves in the 
institutional-legal context in which organizations operate.” The essence of proposition 
one is to identify both the political background in which an information system is 
conceived, developed and implemented and how this political background is reflected in 
the system itself; hence the contribution of our proposed framework to the Socio-
Technical approach. 
 
2nd Proposition:  In a contested system in a non-profit organization, contradictions 
between working practices and the system will be resolved by adding bureaucracy 
specifically if the rules inscribed on the system reflect the goals of those in powerful 
positions 
 
While the administrator was not keen on watering down the controls of the system, but 
he acknowledged that it was getting in the way of the researchers, and alleviated their 
workload by adding administrative assistants, or more bureaucracy. The implication of 
more bureaucracy for resolving contradictions between working practices and the 
system has to be qualified by the fact that our research was carried out in a non-profit 
organization. In a for-profit organization, considerations about costs would probably 
have been more significant in deciding whether or not to hire the administrative 
assistants.  
 
Our theoretical framework, and in particular this proposition, explains why systems that 
are purposefully deployed by management to change working practices may result in 
creating new positions and incurring unexpected costs. Our case illustrates how the 
exercise of power and the unwillingness to change requirements had a price for the 
organization.. Our theory explains this in terms of the system failing to achieve either 
systemic or social integration. This we argue is what occurs with ERP systems, which 
are deployed with the purpose of profoundly changing working practices. Research has 
documented how their costs escalate, as their successful implementation needs the 
addition of consultants and intensive training for existing personnel (Hitt, Wu et al. 2002).  
 
However, it is worth distinguishing on ERP implementation from what occurred at 
CFNCA. In the former, extra personnel and intensive training may signal poor systemic 
integration, while in the latter the positions of new administrative personnel were critical 
for the system to achieve institutionalization. This is an important distinction as extra 
consulting and intensive training may not guarantee institutionalization of an ERP 
implementation. Hence a corollary of this proposition suggests that the presence of 
unplanned consultants and intensive training throughout a system implementation is 
indicative of weak systemic integration, not a sign of future institutionalization.   
                                            
10 Hirschheim and Klein (1994) observe the similarity of this condition regarding the absence of 
power with the ideal speech situation proposed by Habermas (1972). 
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3rd Proposition: The institutionalization of a system would be undermined if there were 
disruptions or contradictions that would disturb the circuits of power: 
 
As reported in the case, after the hiring of the administrative assistants the system still 
experienced disruption. These were mainly technical and occurred when the system was 
moved to the Windows NT platform. That was in 1998 and during that time the system 
broke down with some frequency. However, the disruptions were neither so critical for 
the system to be regarded as a threat to the identities and interests of the organization 
nor so serious that its productivity was questioned. The circuits of power remained 
integrated and the system remained institutionalized. This is not to say that the 
institutionalization of a system lasts forever, as a serious disruption or a change in the 
nature of CFNCA’s work could have brought about questioning of interests, identities 
and productivity. In such a hypothetical situation, the circuits of power would have been 
open to scrutiny and the institutionalization of the system would have been undermined. 
It follows then that if managers (or others) would like to de-institutionalize a system, they 
would have to disrupt the circuits of power. 
 
The institutionalization of a system entails its routinization, and once this is achieved it 
becomes taken for granted, and goes to the background of the organization (Kling and 
Iacono, 1989). When breakdown occur, however, the system comes to the foreground 
and is no longer taken for granted.11 If the interruptions are so frequent that they disrupt 
the working practices of the organization, the systemic circuit of power will become 
unstable, which will impact the circuit of social integration by altering the meanings 
assigned to the system. A corollary of this proposition is that tolerance of failure will be a 
function of power: the degree to which disruptions will be tolerated is inversely 
proportional to the causal power of whoever is affected by the fault. In our case, when 
the interruptions were affecting exclusively the administrative assistants, the tolerance 
was greater than when the interruptions affected the researchers or the administrator. 
Hence the framework can be applied as an analytical tool for studying the political 
connotation of failures and faults since it provides an explanation of why there are 
different levels of tolerance. 
 
In considering the de-institutionalization of a system – that is what we suggest will 
gradually occur if one of the circuits of power becomes unstable – we need to consider 
not only the magnitude of the system but also the time that it has been institutionalized. 
This is clearly explained and illustrated by Kling and Iacono (1989). These authors’ work 
suggest that large and expensive systems in which organizations rely on core productive 
practices and that have been in place for long time will be very difficult to de-
institutionalize. At the time Kling and Iacono (1989: 9) wrote their paper the Social 
Security Administration (SSA still had an old autocoder system to produce 40 million 
checks per month: "The SSA has tried to overhaul the payments system at least three 
times in the last 15 years without success...the persistence of the SSA's outdated 
payments system architecture from the 1950s indicates that large scale CBIS 
                                            
11 This proposition is linked to what Winograd and Flores (1987) suggest occurs with information 
systems and information technology. Although Winograd and Flores refer to IT as a tool and not 
as an institution, we believe this is a valid comparison since what we are referring to here is the 
systemic integration of the system; that is mainly how its technical dimension fits with the 
organizational productive practices. 
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[Computerized Based Information Systems] can be exceptionally difficult to replace." 
Thus, disturbances in the circuits of power may indicate the beginning of a system’s de-
institutionalization, but by no means signal its imminent demise.  
 
Implications for practitioners 
 
The relationship that we have established between the institutionalization of an 
information system and the circuits of power of an organization is a theoretical construct 
that can enrich practitioners’ understanding of systems implementation.12 Specifically, 
our contribution consists of articulating a theoretical framework to make sense of the 
political issues involved in the institutionalization of a system from its conception to its 
routinization. In addition, this paper illustrates the explanatory power of the framework by 
providing an empirical account of how a system reaches institutionalization. Practitioners 
can draw on the Circuits framework to determine the actions and resources, either 
material or discursive, needed for a system to attain institutionalization. The strategic 
view of power brought about by the Circuits framework becomes relevant when 
managers are purposefully not looking for consensus, as in situations where they want 
to bring about radical organizational changes.  
 
Managers and information systems practitioners can use the Circuits framework to 
assess and estimate the political feasibility of an information system project. In 
formulating an implementation strategy, practitioners can use the framework to 
incorporate a political component. They can use each of the circuits and its concepts as 
a checklist before embarking on an information systems project. Each circuit should be 
examined in detail (the questions outlined in Table 1 could be used as a starting point). 
Any strategy for implementation should aim at achieving high levels of social and 
systemic integration. Conversely, as hinted in the previous section, the circuits can also 
be used as a guide when managers would like to de-institutionalize a system. They can 
identify the circuits of power that sustain the system and then formulate strategies that 
would undermine those circuits and consequently produce its de-institutionalization. 
 
By looking at the concepts of the episodic circuit, practitioners may evaluate their 
standing conditions and those of other stakeholders before engaging in a project, 
enhancing the likelihood of having a successful implementation. In short, if the standing 
conditions of the champions of the system are not favorable, the political feasibility of the 
project may be questioned. It is important for practitioners to project clearly the desired 
outcomes of the system’s stakeholders. Practitioners may use the interview guides and 
concepts of Table 1 to elicit the goals of each party involved in the system. If 
contradicting goals are identified, then careful attention to the other circuits of power is 
required. 
 
The concepts of the circuit of social integration draw attention to the rules of meaning 
and membership. This will be particularly useful when looking at discourses of 
                                            
12 Although not in the same exact terms, institutionalization has been previously discussed in the 
implementation IS literature. For example, Cooper and Zmud (1990) consider institutionalization 
as the routinization of an information system and Orlikowski (1992) refers to the 
institutionalization of an information system as the incorporation of its associated repeated 
practices into the structural properties of organizations. Kling and Iacono (1984) highlighted the 
political impacts of an institutionalized information system as a factor for altering resource 
allocation and status within an organization. 
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legitimation related to the system. These discourses are fundamental for enrolling other 
stakeholders whose support is deemed crucial to the success of the system (Callon 
1986). Without legitimation, an information system would likely not receive support, and 
therefore would not achieve institutionalization. Moreover, by drawing on the concepts of 
social integration, practitioners may project the meanings a new system may have for its 
prospective users. If the system has negative connotations for the users, managers and 
analysts may take actions to either modify the system or work with the users so the 
negative meanings are dissipated. Again, the concepts of Table 1 and the data 
collection guide can help practitioners in their attempt to elicit the elements of the social 
integration circuit.  
 
The concept of systemic integration can also be of relevance for practitioners. The 
successful implementation of a system requires considering the disciplinary techniques 
that would accompany it. This is particularly relevant in contested systems, especially 
where the system is weak in social integration. In our case, the administrator eliminated 
alternative means of accessing funds and left the system as the only way to do so. This 
was key for casting the system as an obligatory passage point (Callon, 1986), since the 
funds were fundamental for running research projects. We are not proposing that this 
should be replicated; what we are suggesting is that practitioners need to think of ways 
they can establish the systems as obligatory passage points for the users. In addition to 
disciplinary techniques, systemic integration relates to how the system’s rules impinge 
on working practices. By looking at this relationship, practitioners may reflect on the 
effects of modifying current working practices to serve the purposes of whoever owns 
the system. In our case, the information system was effective as an instrument for 
instilling discipline. 
 
Finally, the strategic nature of the circuits may somehow suggest a Machiavellian 
approach to implementation. This is unavoidable given the intellectual thrust of the 
framework, a strategic conception of power that emphasizes alliances and that actors in 
an organization will have different interests and contradicting interpretations of the same 
actions. This was demonstrated in the case by the administrator’s and researcher’s 
different maneuvers, each pursuing different interests. In this sense, practitioners need 
to reflect on the ethical consequences of using the framework. Professionals have the 
obligation to act responsibly so they do not exploit people as a means to achieve goals. 
This is an obligation for whoever is thinking about articulating a political strategy; a 
challenge that practitioners must address when contrasting their political strategies and 
objectives with the code of ethics of their profession. The Circuits framework is a 
powerful instrument that requires ethical consideration and reflection.  
 
Limitations 
 
We found at least three limitations in our adaptation of the theoretical framework. One is 
its complexity, manifested in the large amount of data that must be gathered in order to 
depict the circuits of power of an organization. And this relates to the second and third 
limitations. Second, while Clegg’s original framework includes an environmental 
component, our adaptation of the framework does not account for the influences of the 
power that come from the environment. We choose not include environmental factors to 
avoid escalating the complexity of the framework, but we did incorporate the data into 
our case so we could compose a coherent narrative.13 Specifically, we were able to 
                                            
13 Clegg (1989) calls this factor exogenous contingencies. In the Appendix that contains our 
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discover that the changes that brought about the new administrative system were 
triggered by a financial crisis in CFNCA after an external audit. The incorporation of the 
environmental factors into the framework could well be an area in which further research 
can be conducted. This would extend the scope of the framework to the area of 
interorganizational power.  
 
The third limitation in our proposed framework concerns our interpretation of facilitative 
power. In discussing the circuit of systemic integration, Clegg indicates that new 
techniques of production  -- besides any disciplinary qualities-  -- will also empower and 
disempower different organizational members. However, instead of focusing on this 
duality, in this paper we emphasized the disciplinary aspects of facilitative power. The 
main reasons for this were twofold. On the one hand, as mentioned above, we wanted to 
keep the complexity of the framework manageable and, on the other hand, the analysis 
of our data indicated that the most salient attribute of facilitative power shown by the 
administrative information system was its disciplinary character. Nevertheless, we 
believe that the empowering/disempowering feature of IS is a topic that researchers in 
our field may be interested in exploring further. In addition to the limitations of the 
adapted framework, our research approach brings about a couple of challenges worthy 
of discussion. 
 
There is a limitation in our discussion of episodic power. In analyzing the initial 
resistance to the system, we observed that it would have been rejected because of its 
poor design and lack of user involvement had it not been for the support of the 
administration and AHS. We based this interpretation on our data and on established IS 
research on participation and acceptance models (Mumford, 1987; Davis, 1989). 
However, we are not implying that those are the only factors that would explain users’ 
resistance when analyzing the circuit of episodic power. In her classic paper about 
power and politics, Markus (1983) observed that the rejection of a system cannot be 
explained only in terms of poor design or attributed to particular characteristics of the 
users.14 In our research, both the theoretical framework and the case study concur with 
Markus’ theory, in the sense that a one-dimensional view of resistance does not fully 
account for the complexity of power relations unleashed in the adoption of information 
systems. Nevertheless, more detailed fieldwork is needed to identify other factors for 
making sense of users’ resistance – we have only identified two – and the focus would 
be on the episodic circuit. 
 
Two of the strengths of interpretivist studies are that they allow an in-depth analysis of 
stakeholders’ motivations and intentions and that they link context to organizational 
processes (Walsham 1993 and 1995). In spite of this, findings of these studies cannot 
be generalized to populations of organizations, and as such, our research cannot be 
used to characterize any type of organization. Our results are circumscribed to the 
adaptation of the theory, its testing, and the provision of analytical insights. As intimated 
above, one of the limitations of the study is that the organization studied was a non-profit 
one. This is a relevant consideration given that its nature permeates not only the 
structure and governance of the organization but also its culture and values. These are 
fundamental elements when studying power. In this sense we may speculate that in an 
                                                                                                                                  
interview guides we incorporated questions regarding the exogenous factor; see under the 
heading: “Exogenous Contingencies”. 
14 As an alternative she proposed what she called a theory of interaction. This theory explains 
resistance in terms of the interaction between the system and characteristics of the users. 
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organization of different nature, users, managers and shareholders would not have been 
that patient with the shortcomings of the system. Nevertheless, the study is still relevant 
in learning about the concepts of the framework and the dynamics of non-profit 
organizations. 
 
Another limitation of our approach is that in order to conduct a study of this nature, 
researchers are required to develop a strong rapport and trusted relationship with their 
interviewees. There are ethical issues here that need careful attention. The researcher 
should inform his interviewees about the purpose of the research, even though this may 
inhibit their responses. Senior management may not consent to a study that asks 
questions about the power relations of the organization. In this particular case, we were 
very fortunate that the authorities of the organization agreed with the research once they 
were ensured of anonymity. Another limitation of our study is the length of time required 
to conduct the fieldwork. To study institutionalization it is necessary that the researchers 
have a particular system under their observation for an extended period of time. For this 
particular research we were privileged with permission to study the system for about six 
years. That may be difficult to emulate in other circumstances. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, as acknowledged early on by Keen (1981) and recently confirmed by 
Jasperson et. al. (2002), the study of power is fundamental to understanding how 
information systems are adopted and used in organizations. Its study is difficult not only 
because of its elusiveness (Jasperson et. al. 2002: 398) but also because of its 
connotation of evil and corruption (Keen 1981: 31). Hence, research on power presents 
both a theoretical and an empirical challenge. This paper is a contribution in those two 
senses. On the one hand, it provides a theoretical framework to analyze the different 
dimensions of power, and on the other, offers an empirical study that details the process 
of institutionalization of an information system from the point of view of power.  However, 
its main contribution consists in stimulating further research on this elusive and still not 
fully understood phenomenon.  
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APPENDIX 
Interviews and data collection guide 
 
The collection of data for this research has been guided by the six main elements of the 
framework described above (outcomes, exogenous contingencies that introduce change 
in the organization, episodic circuit, social integration circuit, system integration circuit 
and obligatory passage points). 
General Topic Guide 
• Research the history of the organization. Focus particularly on the way it usually has 
adopted innovations such as information systems. 
•  Interview people from different levels. This is fundamental. If there is no access to senior 
management and employees, the analysis will lack depth. It would be relevant for the 
study if one can interview people that no longer work in the organization as they are 
outside the scope of action of powerful organizational agents. 
•  Do not tape the interviews. People might hold back if they know they are being recorded, 
especially if the conversation centers on the politics of the organization. 
•  To allow the interviewees to expand their views it is important to use a semi-structured 
type of interview. Ask them to tell a story regarding the information system. Ask for 
examples: Would you tell me the how this information system was developed or 
implemented? Emphasize those issues regarding power and information systems. At the 
end ask the interviewee for a theorization about the facts. This is very important because 
in this part the interviewees tell their own interpretation of the story. 
•  Analyzing documents is also relevant. Particularly those regarding the information 
systems, such as announcements or training documents. It is also important to identify 
who attended launching or introductory meetings and to inquire about the reactions of the 
participants. 
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•  It is important to have a facilitator or sponsor within the organization who understands 
and gets along well with the researcher, so he or she can help in identifying interviewees 
or documents. 
•  It will be relevant if the researcher can participate as an observer in meetings regarding 
the information system. This allows the researcher to grasp the informal dimension of the 
site. 
•  It is important for the researcher to show a neutral position, particularly in conflict 
situations. Interviewees should not perceive that the researcher is collecting information 
to favor any of the parties in conflict. 
INTERVIEWS AND DATA COLLECTION GUIDE FOR IDENTIFYING 
EXOGENOUS CONTINGENCIES 
• Look at the history of the organization and its mission. 
• Identify the position of the organization within its context (e.g. Is the organization among 
the leaders of its industry?). 
• How has the organization adapted to previous information systems or innovations? 
• Describe how the institutionalization was carried out. 
• Was the institutionalization the result of coercive forces, such as legislation or 
regulations? 
• Was the institutionalization the result of mimetic forces? Was the information system 
adopted as a reaction to uncertainty or imitation because it was successful in other 
existing organizations? 
• What variation in the environment of the organization brought about the introduction of 
the information system? 
• What changes in the environment of the organization favored or impeded the introduction 
of the information system? 
Interviews and data collection guide for the circuit of social integration 
 
The identification of this circuit is concerned with the norms, rules of meaning and 
membership that prevail in groups within the organization. These norms and rules allow 
the existence of agents' networks that are created through the process of sociological 
translation (Callon 1986 and 1987; Latour 1987). To identify this circuit, the researcher 
should ask questions such as: What is the relationship between the information system 
and groups (in terms of their participation to sustain or to disrupt the information 
system)? What are the norms that define those groups? What are the membership 
rules? It also will be important to establish how these rules and norms are adopted and 
sustained. In doing so, the researcher should look at the relationship between this circuit 
and the environmental contingencies. This will allow the researcher to determine the 
stability of the norms and the potential influence of the environment over the social 
integration circuit. Issues to focus on include: 
 
• Determine the formal and informal structure of the organization. 
• Identify possible points of strain between the information system and the institutional 
order within the organization. Look for change in meanings; if there is contradiction then 
tension will be unavoidable. 
• If the new system bring about new rules and meanings these may threaten the 
established order. This is important because it shows that the introduction of information 
systems, if successful, can transform the current order. 
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• Has there been any recent change in the group norms or meanings? What was the 
cause of this change? 
• How was the adoption of the information system interpreted? Who set the interpretation 
rules? 
Interviews and data collection guide for the circuit of system integration 
 
The researcher should identify here the technological and material conditions prevailing 
in the organization. This will imply establishing the techniques and knowledge required 
to produce the outcomes and the mechanisms of control and discipline exerted over the 
physical and social context of the organization. The researcher should ask questions 
such as:  
• How are the members (groups and individuals) of the organization achieving their goals?  
• What are the material resources, techniques and skills that organizational members 
require to perform their tasks?  
• What are the mechanisms of control and discipline exerted over the organizational 
members when they perform their activities?  
• Why are particular innovations adopted?  
• Who are the organizations or institutions that are influencing the adoption of the new 
technology?  
• Who benefits? Answering these questions will allow the researcher to identify how the 
environment influences organizations. Thus, the researcher could anticipate what changes in 
the environment might have an impact on the system integration circuit and therefore on the 
organization. 
• Describe the role of the information system in the exercise of power (control or 
surveillance or as an automation tool, i.e. technology for increasing production). 
• What other resources were deployed along with the information system to achieve the 
outcome?: Threats, discourses (words), training, money, and other means of control, 
new rules (either explicit or implicit). 
• Are all agents in the organization subject to the same regime of discipline and control? 
Resistance might arise from those not subject to the same regime. 
Interviews and data collection guide for the episodic circuit of power and 
obligatory passage points 
 
To identify the circuit of episodic power, the researcher should concentrate on the 
struggles to establish or maintain control over resources. Once the information system 
under study has been identified, the researcher should answer questions such as: What 
are the outcomes people intend by executing actions? Who are performing those 
actions?  Which resources do they need? Which alliances allow control over resources? 
Who are resisting them?  
Issues to focus on: 
• Identify power actors (the best way of doing this at the beginning is by asking 
interviewees who they consider to be powerful) 
• How did other agents react? Did they oppose resistance? Describe the resistance 
presented by other agents. 
• How was the resistance outflanked, circumvented or counterpoised? 
• Was the result of the resistance successful? 
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• Ask other agents how they interpreted the objectives of the information systems? 
• Identify which groups wanted to exert power over others, who would oppose resistance 
to keep control over their resources and those who are being disempowered or 
empowered by the introduction of the information system. Those losing discretionality will 
resist and those with more discretionality will perceive that they have been empowered. 
• It is important also to identify those who will be subjects of control by the introduction of 
the information system. Those perceiving themselves as the subject of control might 
resist. 
• Did agents succeed in controlling resources and achieving their outcomes? Describe 
how they achieve this control. How did agents defeat (outflank) resistance? 
• Did subordinates have any chance to resist? Did they know how to resist? Did they have 
resources to offer resistance? 
• What other agents came into play because of the introduction of the information system? 
• What new alliances were required for the institutionalization of the information system? 
• What was the result of the information system? Did those proposing it achieve their 
intended outcomes? 
• Ask managers about their intentions in introducing the information system. 
• Ask managers whether they believe that they have achieved their intended outcomes. 
• Identify the resources (material and symbolic) required by agents to achieve their desired 
outcomes. 
• Examine how the information system was introduced, particularly the explanations, 
negotiations or maneuvers that accompanied the adoption and institutionalization of the 
innovation. 
• Were other agents convinced by explanations, or forced by agents owning the 
information system? 
• How were the explanations for the information system and its rationale for adoption 
presented? 
• By drawing on the sociology of translation identify and describe how the information 
system was institutionalized. 
• Into which terms did agents translate the information system? 
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